In this paper, a physical unclonable function (PUF)advanced encryption standard (AES)-PUF is proposed as a new PUF architecture by embedding an AES cryptographic circuit between two conventional PUF circuits to conceal their challenge-to-response pairs (CRPs) against machine learning attacks. Moreover, an internal confidential data is added to the secret key of the AES cryptographic circuit in the new PUF architecture to update the secret key in real-time against sidechannel attacks. As shown in the results, even if 1 million number of data are enabled by the adversary to implement machine learning or side-channel attacks, the proposed PUF can not be cracked. By contrast, only 100,000 (1,000) number of data are sufficient to leak the confidential information of a conventional PUF via machine learning (side-channel) attacks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the internet of things (IoT), a substantial number of connected devices are bringing about many conveniences and benefits to both manufacturers and customers. Unfortunately, the security of IoT is incapable of keeping pace with the drastic proliferation and innovation [1] , [2] . Silicon physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are well known hardware security primitives which are applied in IoT, for example, generating secret keys [3] , executing authentications [4] , and devising wireless sensors [5] . The basic mechanism of a silicon PUF is to exploit the intrinsic physical randomness of identically designed integrated circuit (IC) components induced by the fabrication process to establish a unique mapping between the input challenges and the output responses (i.e., the challenge-to-response pairs (CRPs)) [6] .
Although the present silicon PUFs may be effective for protecting the IoT against some specific malicious attacks, like hardware reverse engineering attacks [7] , one of the most significant security concerns is their robustness against machine learning attacks [8] , [9] . High linear relationships exist between the CRPs for most conventional silicon PUFs, such as ring-oscillator (RO) PUFs [5] and arbiter PUFs [10] , which cause them to be extremely vulnerable to machine learning. All the improving techniques [6] , [11] , [12] to combat machine learning attacks are focused on increasing the degree of non-linearity between the CRPs. Unfortunately, the high degree of non-linearity may undermine the performance of silicon PUFs [6] , [11] . Furthermore, improving the degree of non-linearity of silicon PUFs only hinders machine learning attacks; it is incapable of thoroughly eliminating the threat of such attacks.
Side-channel attacks are a type of powerful non-invasive attacks that can be utilized by the adversary to leak the confidential information of modern ICs through exploring the correlation between the processed data and the physical leakages (i.e., power dissipation, electromagnetic (EM) emission, temperature, and timing) of the modern IC [13] - [16] , [22] . Advanced encryption standard (AES) is a modern cryptographic algorithm that contains a stored secret key and is widely used to encrypt confidential data [13] , [17] , [18] . It is well-known that the secret key of an unprotected AES cryptographic circuit can be disclosed without much effort if side-channel attacks are implemented. In order to secure an AES cryptographic circuit against side-channel attacks, all the existing countermeasures such as masking [19] and hiding [14] , [20] are trying to break the aforementioned correlation between the processed data and the physical leakages. Unfortunately, these existing countermeasures [14] , [19] , [20] are not adequately secure and cause significant power/area/performance overhead to the AES circuit.
In this paper, a novel and innovative PUF: key-updating (KU) AES-embedded PUF is devised against both machine learning and side-channel attacks, without increasing the degree of non-linearity between the CRPs and without using the existing countermeasures. An AES cryptographic circuit is embedded into the PUF architecture to encrypt the CRPs of the PUF against machine learning attacks. Furthermore, the secret key of AES circuit is updated by the interior confidential data against side-channel attacks.
The remainder of the brief is organized as follows. The working principle of the proposed PUF is clearly introduced in Section II. State-of-the-art machine learning attacks: convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are performed on our PUF to evaluate its robustness in Section III. Section IV presents the possible side-channel attacks on the novel PUF to disclose the secret key. The performance of the proposed PUF is assessed in Section V. Conclusions are offered in Section VI. Fig. 1(a) shows a diagram of a conventional PUF chip under machine learning attacks. Since both the input challenge C 1 and the output response R 1 are exposed to the adversary directly, the PUF chip-1 can be cracked by machine learning attacks through training a reasonable number of CRPs. If we explore the design by connecting a conventional PUF circuit in series with an AES circuit to build a new PUF: hybrid PUF, as shown in Fig. 1(b) , the adversary may not be able to unriddle the secret information of the conventional PUF via machine learning attacks directly. However, the hybrid PUF in Fig. 1(b) is not sufficiently secure. The primary reason is that the output data R 2 of the AES is exposed to the adversary, therefore, the secret key K c of the AES may be leaked to the adversary by analyzing the correlation between the output data R 2 and a certain physical leakage of the PUF chip-2 if a side-channel attack is executed. Once the secret key K c of the AES is leaked, the output response R 1 of the conventional PUF will also be disclosed. As a result, the conventional PUF in Fig. 1 (b) can be uncovered by training the (C 1 , R 1 ) pairs with machine learning attacks ultimately.
II. WORKING PRINCIPLE OF THE PROPOSED PUF
So as to eliminate the threats from both side-channel and machine learning attacks, a key-updating (KU) AESembedded PUF is proposed as shown in Fig. 1(c) . The novel and innovative PUF architecture is secure against machine learning attacks, without increasing the degree of non-linearity between the CRPs. As indicated in Fig. 1(c) , an AES circuit is embedded between two conventional PUF circuits and the output response R 1 of the PUF #1 circuit is encrypted by the AES circuit to provide the input challenge R 2 to the PUF #2 circuit. Since the output response R 1 of the PUF #1 and the input challenge R 2 of the PUF #2 are concealed, the adversary is incapable of performing machine learning attacks on either of the two PUF circuits.
Another novel idea is proposed to eliminate the threat of side-channel attacks, which does not rely on the existing countermeasures. It is proposed to add a real-time key-updating function to the architecture that combines the output response R 1 of the PUF #1 with the stored secret key K c of the AES to create the actual key K a c used by the AES circuit (K a c = R 1 ⊕ K c ). This is illustrated in Fig. 1(c) . Since the input data R 1 and the output data R 2 of the AES are unknown to the adversary and the actual secret key K a c of the AES is updating in real-time, the adversary is unable to execute sidechannel attacks to reveal the stored secret key K c .
III. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST MACHINE LEARNING ATTACKS
For an m-bit KU AES-embedded PUF as shown in Fig. 1(c) , the input data/output data of the PUF #1, the AES, and the PUF #2, respectively, are
.., c 1,m ) 2 , the relationship between the input challenge C 1 and the output response R 1 of the PUF #1 can be preliminarily modeled as
where E 1 is the m × m matrix which represents the operation induced by the PUF #1 in Fig. 1(c) . e i,j , (i, j = 1, 2, ..., m) is the element of the matrix E 1 . Since the output data R 1 of the PUF #1 should be a binary data, the output data (1) needs to be normalized by a step function u(x, ∆x) as shown below
where ∆x is the critical point of the step function u(x, ∆x). As a result, the output data R 1 of the PUF #1 under the normalization of the step function u(x, ∆x) can be precisely determined as
where ∆x 1 is the critical point associated with the PUF #1. Similarly, the accurate output data R 2 of the AES in Fig.  1(c) can also be derived as
where ∆x 0 is the critical point related with the AES and A is the m × m matrix that denotes the math operation processed by the AES circuit as shown below (a i,j (C 1 ) is the element in matrix A)
Kindly note that the actual secret key K a c of the AES in Fig.  1(c) is updated by the internal confidential data R 1 in realtime, thus the element a i,j (C 1 ) varies under a different input challenge C 1 .
Once the output data R 2 of the AES is obtained, the m-bit output response R 3 of the KU AES-embedded PUF in Fig.  1(c) under the input challenge C 1 is expressed as
where ∆x 2 is the critical point associated with the PUF #2 and E 2 is the corresponding m × m matrix induced by the PUF #2 that is written as (e * i,j is the element in matrix E 2 ) 
A
. Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) Attacks on PUF Primitives
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are a kind of advanced machine learning algorithms that can be explored to reveal the secret information. If a CNN attack is performed on a 128-bit regular PUF: arbiter PUF, the detailed CNN architecture for modeling the arbiter PUF is illustrated in Table  I . The 128-bit input challenge C 1 = (c 1,1 , c 1,2 , ..., c 1,128 ) 2 of the arbiter PUF is transformed into a 8 × 16 × 1 matrix to establish the input training data for the CNNs. Moreover, the most significant bit (MSB) of the output response of the arbiter PUF is selected as the output training data for the CNN structure in Table I activation function used in layer 1, respectively, are 3 × 3 and ReLU. In layer 2, a max pooling operation is executed on the obtained 6 × 14 × 64 matrix to generate the 3 × 7 × 64 matrix. The main intention of executing max pooling is reducing the matrix size and maintaining the critical features.
As shown in Table I , in layer 3 and layer 4, a dropout operation and a flatten operation are performed. Then the 1 × 1 × 1344 array is acquired when the flatten operation is finished. The dropout probability that is used in layer 3 is set as 0.25. Furthermore, from layer 5 to layer 9, dense operation and dropout operation are executed in the CNNs alternately. The sizes of the output arrays of layer 5, layer 6, layer 7, and layer 8 are achieved as 1 × 1 × 1024, 1 × 1 × 1024, 1 × 1 × 512, and 1 × 1 × 512, respectively. The corresponding dropout probability in layer 6 and layer 8 is selected as 0.75. Eventually, in the output of layer 9, the 1 × 1 × 2 array that is used for classifying the MSB of the output response as "0" or "1" is created. Kindly note that the activation functions selected in layer 5, layer 7, and layer 9, respectively, are ReLU, ReLU, and Softmax. The optimizer and loss function of the CNN training are chosen with adam and categorical crossentropy, respectively. Additionally, the batch size of the CNN training is optimized with 50.
A 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF and a 128-bit arbiter PUF are simulated in Cadence with the 130 nm IBM CMOS technology kit, respectively. Kindly note that the simulated KU AES-embedded PUF consists of two 128-bit arbiter PUF circuits and one 128-bit AES circuit. In addition, the corre- sponding CRPs of these two PUFs are also extracted from Cadence simulation. As shown in Fig. 2 , when the CNN attack is executed on the 128-bit arbiter PUF, after training about 1 × 10 5 data, the training (testing) accuracy is obtained as 0.934 (0.927) and the corresponding training (testing) loss is 0.225 (0.234) when the number of epochs is set as 20. By contrast, even if 1 million data are enabled for training, the training/testing accuracy of the CNNs for modeling the 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF is still around 0.5, as shown in Table  II . Hence, the KU AES-embedded PUF we propose exhibits a good robustness against the regular CNN attacks.
B. New Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) Attacks on the Proposed PUF Primitive
In Section 3.1, since the stored key K c in Fig. 1(c) is assumed to be unknown to the adversary, the conventional CNN attacks attempt to disclose the confidential information of the KU AES-embedded PUF by regarding the PUF as a black box. However, if the secret key K c is leaked, a novel CNN attack may be tailored to model the confidential information of the KU AES-embedded PUF.
When the secret key K c is leaked, the exact relationship between the input data R 1 and the output data R 2 of the AES in Fig. 3(a) will be revealed. In other words, the secret m × m matrix A associated with the AES is always exposed to the adversary. As a result, only two PUF matrices E 1 and E 2 in (6) are unknown to the adversary. To simplify the CNN attack, if the matrix E 1 is selected with an m × m identity matrix I and the critical point ∆x 1 is set as 0.5, (6) becomes
where E 3 and ∆x 3 , respectively, are the m × m matrix and critical point induced by an equivalent PUF circuit. Since C 1 × I × A × E 3 is equal to C 1 × A × E 3 , a new PUF architecture as shown in Fig. 3(b) can be devised to emulate the KU AESembedded PUF if the secret key K c is disclosed.
In Fig. 3(b) , PUF #3 is the equivalent PUF circuit that is related with the matrix E 3 in (8). Furthermore, the output data R * 2 of the AES in Fig. 3(a) can be unriddled since the input data C 1 and secret key K c of the AES are open for the adversary. Accordingly, a CNN attack can be performed on the equivalent PUF circuit: PUF #3 because its CRPs: (R * 2 , R 3 ) are available for training. Once the PUF #3 is cracked, the adversary is able to predict output response R 3 under any input challenge C 1 . Table III shows the results of the new CNN attack on the 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF if the adversary knows the stored key K c . The corresponding training/testing accuracy can be over 0.9. Consequently, the most significant security concern for the KU AES-embedded PUF is preventing the secret key K c from being leaked to the adversary.
IV. RESILIENCE AGAINST SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS
For the KU AES-embedded PUF we propose, the input data R 1 and output data R 2 of the AES in Fig. 1(c) are unknown to the adversary. As a result, to implement side-channel attacks on the KU AES-embedded PUF to reveal the stored key K c , the adversary can only analyze the correlation between the input challenge C 1 /output response R 3 in Fig. 1(c) and the physical leakages of the PUF chip.
Power attacks [13] , [20] , [21] are a kind of side-channel attacks that are widely used by the adversary to disclose the secret key of a cryptographic circuit through monitoring the correlation between the processed data and the power dissipation of the cryptographic circuit. For the m-bit KU AES-embedded PUF in Fig. 1(c (3). Suppose the m-bit stored key K c of the KU AES-embedded PUF is K c = (k c,1 , k c,2 , ..., k c,m ) 2 , the actual key K a c of the AES in Fig. 1(c 
As a result, the real secret key K a c will be updated in realtime if different input challenge values: (c 1,1 , c 1,2 , . .., c 1,m ) 2 are enabled.
When a power attack is performed on the KU AESembedded PUF, the adversary may combine the input chal- lenge with the hypothesized keys to predict the power dissipation of the PUF at first. Then the correlation analysis will be executed between the predicted power and the measured power to estimate the secret key. Fig. 4 shows the results of simulated power attacks for (a) a 128-bit unprotected AES cryptographic circuit and (b) the 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF. As shown in Fig. 4(a) , the 8-bit secret sub-key 96 of the unprotected AES circuit is disclosed after inputting 1,000 plaintexts of data. However, for the AES-embedded PUF, the secret sub-key 96 is masked from being leaked to the adversary even if 1 million plaintexts are enabled, as shown in Fig. 4(b) . In addition, the absolute value of correlation coefficient (AVCC) of the correct key 96 in Fig. 4(b) is two orders of magnitude lower than the AVCC of the correct key 96 in Fig. 4(a) . The primary reason is that the actual secret key in the embedded PUF is updating in real-time which greatly weakens the correlation between the processed data and the power dissipation against power attacks.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Commonly, uniqueness, randomness, and reliability are the three most significant parameters for assessing the performance of a designed PUF [5] , [6] . To evaluate the performance of the proposed PUF, A 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF is designed and simulated in Cadence software with the 130 nm CMOS technology kit. Moreover, Monte Carlo simulations are executed on the designed PUF in Cadence to emulate the random fabrication process. As shown in Fig. 5(a) , the uniqueness U is improved from 52.4% to 50.4% if the CMOS technology node L g is scaled from 130 nm to 14 nm; while the randomness R improves from 47.1% to 49.5%. In addition, Fig. 5(b) shows the worst reliability of the embedded PUF is about 97.4% when the supply voltage is 1.0 V. The simulation results manifest the proposed PUF has excellent uniqueness, randomness, and reliability.
VI. CONCLUSION
A novel PUF-AES-PUF architecture in conjunction with a key-updating technique is utilized to design a state-of-the-art PUF primitive that is able to resist non-invasive attacks. The proposed PUF not only has excellent uniqueness (52.4%), randomness (47.1%), and reliability (97.4%) but also maintains a high security level (>1 million data) against both side-channel and machine learning attacks.
